

3 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: The Honorable W. Averell Harriman's appearance 2 June 1960 in Open Session before the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations.

1. Mr. Harriman began with a prepared statement, a verbatim copy of which is attached. Committee Chairman Jackson asked Mr. Harriman what he thought was the effect in the Soviet Union of the failure of the Summit Conference. Mr. Harriman replied that the Summit failure could be viewed as a victory for those Soviet leaders who did not agree with the detente efforts of Khrushchev. Mr. Harriman added that some efforts were being made by the Soviet leadership to play down the Summit failure citing as examples the recent release of a U.S. transport plane's personnel, and Khrushchev's 29 May speech.

2. Mr. Harriman stated that he was glad to see that the President will continue his efforts to negotiate with the Soviet leaders. He said that the most important loss to come out of Paris was the withdrawal of the invitation to the President to visit the Soviet Union. He said that he believed that Mr. Eisenhower would have received a more tumultuous reception than any world leader has experienced in recent years. While he felt the possibility of success was unlikely, he thought that the United States must make every effort to convince the Soviet Union to renew the invitation.


3. Mr. Harriman stated that Khrushchev had probably been shaken by the President's assumption of full responsibility for the U-2 flight. Khrushchev had staked his reputation on the development of a personal relationship between the President and himself. Mr. Harriman added, however, that the change in attitude in the Soviet Union toward East-West detente had begun before the U-2 incident.

4. Mr. Harriman stated that despite the Summit failure, the United States must press for increased contacts with the Government and people of the Soviet Union. He stated he favored a calm, though unappealing attitude. He said that the people in the Soviet Union still cling to the hope of returning to the World War II relationship between the United States and the USSR.

5. Senator Javits asked Mr. Harriman's viewpoint on summitry versus traditional diplomacy, pointing out that Mr. George Kennan, in a recent appearance before the Subcommittee, had favored a return to traditional diplomacy. Stating that he had the utmost respect for Mr. Kennan's judgment, Mr. Harriman said that the multi-national nature of almost every world problem today no longer permits the use of time-honored diplomatic

machinery. Mr. Harriman added that as long as one man in the Soviet Union must approve every decision, summit meetings are the only possible means for solving international problems. He concluded that American policy machinery must contemplate summitry.

6. In reply to a question from Mr. Pendleton, the Minority Counsel, Mr. Harriman stated that the United States should not attempt to sell its own economic system abroad but should confine its activities to fighting the battle between freedom and dictatorship. Private enterprise, he said, should not be a condition of United States foreign aid.



Office of General Counsel

STAT

Attachment

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

Missing attachment